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1Abstract
It is widely known that agents conﬁdence is closely linked to macroeconomic cycles. A conﬁ-
dence channel may therefore have a signiﬁcant impact in accelerating and amplifying the trans-
mission of shocks accross borders. We endeavor to ﬁnd empirical proof of the existence of a
conﬁdence channel between G7 countries (and Spain). This paper centers around the concept of a
contagion of conﬁdence from “large countries” to “small countries”. I apply instrumental-variable
regressions to OECD standardized Consumers and Business Conﬁdence measures, in order to
investigate the relationship between the conﬁdence series of all G7 countries, and Spain. Macroe-
conomic variables are included in these regressions to control for domestic causes of conﬁdence
changes. We ﬁnd that, even after having controlled for domestic macroeconomic causes of conﬁ-
dence level variations, the level of conﬁdence of agents in large countries does have an inﬂuence
on the level of conﬁdence of agents in smaller countries.
Il est connu que la conﬁance des agents est très fortement liée aux cycles macroéconomiques.
Un canal de la conﬁance pourrait donc non seulement accélérer, mais également ampliﬁer la
transmission des chocs macroéconomiques par delà les frontières. Nous cherchons à mettre en
évidence une preuve empirique de l’existence d’un canal de la conﬁance entre les pays du G7 (et
l’Espagne). Le concept étudié sera celui d’une contagion de la conﬁance des “gros pays” vers
les “petits pays”. Les séries Consumer et Business Conﬁdence Index de l’OCDE représentent la
conﬁance des agents d’un pays, et leurs interactions sont modélisées par des régressions à variables
instrumentales. Des variables macroéconomiques sont également incluses dans ces régressions pour
capturer l’eﬀet de l’environnement macroéconomique sur la conﬁance des agents. Nous concluons
que, même après avoir contrôlé des eﬀets macroéconomiques des variations de la conﬁance, le
niveau de conﬁance des agents dans les “gros pays” conserve une inﬂuence signiﬁcative sur le
niveau de conﬁance des agents des pays plus “petits”.
21 Introduction
Despite the popularity of Consumer and Business Conﬁdence Indicators in the press, economists have
not yet found a consensus on how to interpret agents’ conﬁdence. The importance that it should be
given in empirical research or theoretical models also remains unclear. However, a clear interest for
the role of conﬁdence in the economy tends to resurface with each period of economic downturn, and
even more so today, as economics seems to be undergoing a profound crisis.
Beyond the eﬀects of the traditional trade and ﬁnancial channels, a channel of conﬁdence could not
only accelerate the transmission of macroeconomic shocks, but also amplify their eﬀects. The concept
of such a conﬁdence channel and its implications are often mentioned in the literature, but rarely
explored in detail. The strong correlation between agents conﬁdence and domestic macroeconomic
situation is broadly supported by the data. Therefore, if agents in one country are inﬂuenced by the
conﬁdence of agents in another country, this could have signiﬁcant impacts on the workings of the
economy. In the absence of an established theoretical framework, I will endeavor to use simple and
intuitive tools to support (or invalidate) the existence of conﬁdence contagion between G7 countries
(and Spain).
Whereas previous papers tended to concentrate on the domestic eﬀects of conﬁdence shocks, or to
only consider a limited set of countries, I will instead apply my methods to those eight countries in
a systematic manner. The aim is to expose the existence of conﬁdence contagion between a broad
range of countries. My study will be based on the concepts of “large countries” as opposed to “small
countries”: in any pair of countries, the smaller one (Italy or Spain for instance) will be inﬂuenced by
the larger one (the United States for instance). The concepts of “large” and “small” refer of course
to their weight in the world economy, and not to other characteristics like surface.
In terms of recent publications, Beaudry et al. [2008] use VAR models to show that, subsequent the
arrival of news about better productivity in the US or in Germany, there is an expansion not only of the
domestic economy, but also of the economy of Canada and Austria (respectively). Nevertheless, my
approach diﬀers from theirs in that I devote my attention to conﬁdence series instead of stock indices,
and disregard in my models the macroeconomic consequences of conﬁdence movements. Moreover,
they do not include in their study any variable representing the conﬁdence of small countries. Horn
[2003] also studies the conﬁdence channel through regressions, but he only considers the inﬂuence of
the US on Germany, and does not control for macroeconomic causes of conﬁdence variation. The
substantial paper by Anderton et al. [2004] also contains a short disgression on the conﬁdence channel
between the US and the Euro Area.
Another branch of the literature studying conﬁdence series tries to measure their predictive power
(Ludvigson [2004], Smithies Committee [1955], Juster [1964]). In general, such studies conclude that
there exists some mediocre predictive power of conﬁdence indicators for macroeconomic variables.
Recently, many researchers have also investigated the eﬀects of anticipation shocks on macroeconomic
variables, using mainly DSGE or SVAR tools. Those papers (Beaudry and Portier [2004], Beaudry
et al. [2008], Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2008], Barsky and Sims [2009]) emphasize the importance
of anticipations in macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. Jaimovich and Rebelo [2006] generate recessions
using only anticipation shocks, and no real shocks. Furthermore, Matsusaka and Sbordone [1995],
3demonstrate that, even after having controlled for some macroeconomic causes, consumer conﬁdence
always Granger-causes domestic GDP, and this for all G8 countries.
The litterature suggests many possible representations of conﬁdence: “irrationally biased anticipa-
tions”, “perception of information”, “stock prices”, and so on. It is inherently diﬃcult to deﬁne and
measure agents’ conﬁdence. In this study, I simply use consumer conﬁdence and business conﬁdence
series, which are ﬂawed, but seem to represent the most obvious choice. Household conﬁdence is
therefore represented by the Consumer Conﬁdence Indicator (CCI), and business conﬁdence by the
Business Conﬁdence Indicator (BCI) of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development.
Countries taken into account are G7 countries, Spain, and the Euro Area is also included in some
cases. National series from these countries have been harmonized by the OECD in order to ensure
comparability, which is necessary to the coherency of our results
Section 2 will summarily present the data, and give values of bilateral contemporaneous correlations.
That is, we see that there is in most cases a strong comovement of conﬁdence series accross the board of
countries. Section 3 explains the methodology we will use to demonstrate the contagion of conﬁdence
from large coutnries to small countries. Section 4 highlights the issues we may encounter due to
endogeneous variables, and describes my reasoning in trying to overcome these problems. Section 5
presents the empirical results, that point to a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of large countries on small countries
for conﬁdence levels. Section 6 investigates the existence of cointegration relationships, in an attempt
to circumvent possible spurious regression issues. Finally, section 7 concludes.
4(a) Business Conﬁdence Index, 1985-2009
(b) Consumer Conﬁdence Index, 1973-2009
Figure 1 – Comovement of conﬁdence series between all countries
2 A look at the data
We will start by having a quick look at plots of conﬁdence series, followed by values of contemporaneous
correlations, as a ﬁrst indicator of synchronization between countries.
2.1 Comovement
We can see that in general, business conﬁdence series series follow a rather similar pattern through
time for all countries (Figure 1(a)). This is particularly true for Euro Area countries. However, as
far as consumer conﬁdence is concerned, the series seem to be much less synchronized. At ﬁrst sight
(Figure 1(b)), there is no obvious similarity, apart from the period 2007-2009, where all conﬁdence
series have dipped in a spectacular manner.
5(a) Consumer Conﬁdence Index (b) Business Conﬁdence Index
Table 1 – Contemporanous bilateral correlations of conﬁdence series
2.2 Contemporanous correlations
Table 1 presents bilateral correlations between all our contemporaneous conﬁdence indicators.
For consumer conﬁdence, we notice that the values of correlations are not necessarily coherent with the
synchronization of real macroeconomic cycles between those two countries. For instance, correlation
between the growth rate of GDP in Italy and the United States is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
0, whereas correlation of their respective CCI is greater than 0.5. On the contrary, Japanese GDP
growth is not signiﬁcantly correlated with american or european growth: and indeed, the correlation
of the CCI are also non-signiﬁcant1.
Business conﬁdence indicators are in general better correlated than consumer conﬁdence indicators,
which is coherent with our observation from Figure 1. Indeed, a much greater proportion of those
correlations are larger than 0.5. However, we can notice the relative weakness of correlations between
Euro Area countries and the United States. The values concerning BCI are much easier to interpret
that those concerning CCI. Business conﬁdence series between Euro Area countries are strongly re-
lated, but less so with that of the United States. Businesses in the United Kingdom, on the other
hand, are equally close to businesses in the United States or in the Euro Area in terms of conﬁdence.
Businesses in France, Italy and Spain are particularly similar. Business conﬁdence in Japan, while
exhibiting no signiﬁcant comovement with BCI of anglo-saxon countries, is well synchronized with
German BCI, possibly because of the similar economic characteristics of those two countries, which
are both invested in high-technology industry and rely strongly on exportations.
1Values of GDP growth rate correlations taken from Lambert and Chavy-Martin [2008]
63 Detecting the inﬂuence of large countries
In the previous section, we have seen that there appears to be a strong international synchronization
of conﬁdence movements. Now, I will try to determine what causes changes in consumer and business
conﬁdence. It is intuitive to say that agents’ conﬁdence may be inﬂuenced by the macroeconomic
situation that they observe around them. Therefore, I will ﬁrst try to explain movements in conﬁdence
by changes in domestic macroeconomic variables. That is, I will regress conﬁdence series on the growth
of GDP, the growth of consumption, of unemployment, and so on. In a second step, I will include
in those regressions the conﬁdence series of some large country, such as the United States. I will
show that in most cases, even after controlling for macroeconomic causes, the conﬁdence level of large
countries has a signiﬁcant role to play in the determination of the conﬁdence level of smaller countries.
Due to the availability of some macroeconomic variables, data frequency is quarterly. Macroeconomic
variables involved are: the growth of GDP, of consumption, of hourly wages, of unemployment, of
investment (Gross Fixed Capital Formation is used as a proxy for investment), capacity utilization
rates, long term interest rates, an index of share prices, as well as inﬂation2. Growth rates from a
series X are given by 400 × (ln(Xt) − ln(Xt−1)). Series that exhibited a seasonality pattern were
deseasonalized using the mobile average method. These series were then smoothed with a Kalman
ﬁlter, according to the method described in Stock and Watson [2003], in order to eliminate potential
stochastic trends: indeed, we are mostly interested in eﬀects induced by quarter to quarter changes.
Moreover, the two variables “growth rate of GFCF” and “growth rate of capacity utilization rate”,
which intuitively do not aﬀect Consumer Conﬁdence, are only included in BCI regressions.
Of course, many other factors could potentially explain changes in conﬁdence levels: savings, taxes,
house prices, and so on. It would also have been possible to replace some of the aforementionned
variables by other variables of similar interpretation: the unemployment rate by hours worked, for
instance, or private consumption by its components (services and non-durables goods). However,
I have tried to avoid overidentiﬁcation, and have therefore restrained myself to the most common
macroeconomic variables, whose impact on conﬁdence would be the most obvious.
“ Basic ” models simply regress the conﬁdence series on its own lagged value.
Ct = a + bCt−1 + et
where Ct is a conﬁdence indicator (in level).
“ Domestic ” regressions are models that explain the variations in conﬁdence series by the inclusion
of domestic macroeconomic variables
Ct = a + b0Ct−1 + b1X1,t + ... + bjXj,t + cY Yt−1 + cUUt−1 + et
where Xi,t are domestic macroeconomic variables (in growth). Because it is reasonable to assume
that conﬁdence can be adjusted instantaneously following a change in macroeconomic factors, the
contemporaneous values of these explanatory variables are used.
We also include in the regression Yt−1, which is the lagged value of the growth of GDP, and Ut−1, which
2A complete description of macroeconomic variables used can be found in appendix B.
7is the lagged value of the growth of unemployment. These two variables represent the inﬂuence of
“headline news”. That is, an agent’s conﬁdence at any point in time t can be inﬂuenced not only by the
macroeconomic situation that he is experiencing in the quarter t, but also by the headline ﬁgures that
he hears from the media, which typically will describe the macroeconomic situation of the previous
quarter t−1. The ﬁgures most typically reported by the media being GDP and unemployment, these
are the two series that I retain.
Finally, foreign explanatory variables are added to the domestic ones. We are trying to show that
some of the residual variance which is not explained by the agents’ domestic environment comes from
an inﬂuence by the conﬁdence levels of agents in “large countries”. These are our “ﬁnal” regressions.








t is a conﬁdence series from the large country, and Y l
t is the GDP series of the large country.
If the parameters d0 and d1 are signiﬁcant on one hand, and if the inclusion of those foreign variables
leads to a signiﬁcant increase in the ﬁt of the regression, than I will conclude that there exists a
contagion of conﬁdence from large countries to small countries.
The inclusion of the large country’s GDP, and of its lag, allows us to control whether the contagion
of conﬁdence happens in a direct or indirect manner. This will be explained in more detail in section
5, under the paragraph How to interpret those results.
In order to determine whether a signiﬁcant increase in R2 follows the inclusion of foreign variables
in the regression, a Fisher test for R2 incrementation is used. That is, the null hypothesis is “R2












where, if (1) is nested in (2), R2
i represent the model ﬁt, ki are degrees of freedom, n is the total
number of observations. This test statistic can be compared to critical values of a Fisher distribution
with (k2 − k1) and (n − k2 − 1) degress of freedom: I have chosen a size of 10%.
All those models are estimated using an heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. We will see
that some of the conﬁdence series may be integrated of ﬁrst order instead of being stationary (see
Table 9). In this case, it is possible that a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero parameter estimate is
ellicited between two conﬁdence series, that is spuriously large. However, in our case, this problem
should not occur, since both the lags of the dependant and the independant conﬁdence series are
included in the explanatory variables3.
The concepts of large and small countries are of course relative. Germany for instance may at the same
time be a small country when compared with the United States, and a large country when compared
to Italy. The “small country”/“large country” couples that we have tested for are the following:
• Canada: US
• Germany: US
3Hamilton, Time Series Analysis, p.561
8• Japan: US, Euro Area
• United Kingdom: US, Euro Area
• France: US, Germany
• Spain: US, Germany, France
• Italy: US, Germany, France
4 Endogeneity or exogeneity?
All our regressions are potentially subject to an endogeneity problem. Take the simple example of ex-
plaining variations in Consumer Conﬁdence levels by the consumption growth rate. When households
observe that their ability to consume is on the rise, their conﬁdence is also expected to increase; on
the other hand, when consumers’ conﬁdence in the future increases, their level of consumption may
also rise (through a higher expectation of future wages, for instance). In this situation, it may be
appropriate to use instrumental variable estimation instead of ordinary least squares estimation.
4.1 Methodology and choice of instrumental variables
Endogeneity in our models arises from the fact that conﬁdence levels can have an inﬂuence on the
macroeconomic situation of a country, as agents spontaneously modify their behaviours (consumption,
investment, and so on) according to their expectations of the future. However, not all macroeconomic
variables stand to be directly aﬀected by movements in conﬁdence. For instance, Business Conﬁdence
has little to do in the short term with consumption growth rates. Similarly, Business Conﬁdence can be
directly linked to movements in the unemployment rate, as managers will hire more or less depending
on their expectations of the future; but changes in Consumer Conﬁdence may have little direct eﬀect
on employment. I have assumed in the following that only certain variables are endogenous with
each kind of conﬁdence index. That is, the growth of GDP and consumption are endogenous with
the Consumer Conﬁdence index. The growth rate of GDP, unemployment, hourly wages, GFCF and
capacity utilization are considered potentially endogenous with Business Conﬁdence. Finaly, the long
term interest rates, share prices and inﬂation rates are taken as exogenous (indeed, interest rates and
share prices could have been endogenous with investor conﬁdence, which we do not study here).
This assumption allows us to slightly narrow down the number of endogenous variables that we are
facing. The instrumental variables that I choose are the lagged once series of the macroeconomic
variables entering in our regression equations. I also include lags of some other macroeconomic vari-
ables such as short-term interested rates, civilian employment, labor costs, trade balance. An index of
overall GDP growth (simple average of all GDP growth rates across diﬀerent countries) intervenes as
well. Finally, in the regressions concerning Consumer Conﬁdence, since GFCF and capacity utilzation
do not enter the models are regressors, and are likely exogenous, these two variables are also used as
instrumental variables.
9BCI regressions CCI regressions
growth of R2 Partial R2 F-stat p-value growth of R2 Partial R2 F-stat p-value
US GDP 0,67 0,37 10,70 0,00 GDP 0,69 0,41 19,90 0,00
Wage 0,56 0,40 22,77 0,00 Cons. 0,63 0,30 18,96 0,00
Unemp. 0,79 0,47 21,65 0,00
GFCF 0,67 0,22 7,30 0,00
Cap. U. 0,57 0,20 4,22 0,00
CA GDP 0,63 0,39 3,01 0,00 GDP 0,71 0,26 9,56 0,00
Wage 0,26 0,20 1,35 0,23 Cons. 0,51 0,15 5,43 0,00
Unemp. 0,47 0,18 1,01 0,46
GFCF 0,44 0,31 2,48 0,01
Cap. U. 0,62 0,42 4,12 0,00
JP GDP 0,66 0,25 2,75 0,01 GDP 0,63 0,53 27,20 0,00
Wage 0,34 0,22 3,16 0,00 Cons. 0,35 0,17 4,57 0,00
Unemp. 0,41 0,15 2,05 0,05
GFCF 0,38 0,17 2,14 0,04
Cap. U. 0,48 0,31 5,73 0,00
UK GDP 0,66 0,33 3,73 0,00 GDP 0,59 0,28 3,40 0,00
Wage 0,25 0,23 4,47 0,00 Cons. 0,45 0,17 3,33 0,00
Unemp. 0,61 0,18 2,57 0,02
GFCF 0,39 0,18 2,84 0,01
Cap. U. 0,18 0,08 2,18 0,04
DE GDP 0,51 0,22 5,49 0,00 GDP 0,50 0,35 20,26 0,00
Wage 0,27 0,22 3,98 0,00 Cons. 0,35 0,20 11,09 0,00
Unemp. 0,60 0,11 6,76 0,00
GFCF 0,42 0,23 3,56 0,00
Cap. U. 0,48 0,26 3,10 0,01
FR GDP 0,70 0,42 12,83 0,00 GDP 0,59 0,42 14,79 0,00
Wage 0,31 0,19 4,81 0,00 Cons. 0,26 0,14 5,15 0,00
Unemp. 0,78 0,24 8,11 0,00
GFCF 0,66 0,38 9,97 0,00
Cap. U. 0,48 0,22 2,60 0,02
SP GDP 0,49 0,17 2,35 0,03 GDP 0,55 0,34 6,90 0,00
Wage 0,31 0,24 2,65 0,02 Cons. 0,65 0,29 6,82 0,00
Unemp. 0,66 0,15 3,29 0,00
GFCF 0,52 0,23 2,65 0,02
Cap. U. 0,35 0,24 3,31 0,00
IT GDP 0,53 0,26 5,56 0,00 GDP 0,56 0,42 8,08 0,00
Wage 0,31 0,18 4,60 0,00 Cons. 0,37 0,20 5,11 0,00
Unemp. 0,35 0,22 4,18 0,00
GFCF 0,44 0,25 4,22 0,00
Cap. U. 0,41 0,25 9,07 0,00
Table 2 – First stage statistics









Table 3 – P-values of overidentiﬁcation tests
For each regression equation, I select the combination of instrumental variables amongst those de-
scribed above that seems to be the best. That is, I attempt to maximize the ﬁrst stage partial R2
and the robust F-statistic. I also check that the combination of instrumental variables does not cause
overidentiﬁcation issues. However, the great number of regressions and of potentially endogenous
variables makes it diﬃcult to select instruments that are powerful enough on each occasion. Because
most regressions exhibit a weak instruments problem, simply using OLS estimation may produce
less biased and more eﬃcient results. In keeping with this notion, I use the Durbin-Wu-Hausman
exogeneity test to determine which variables should truly be considered as endogenous, and which
could be considered as exogenous, and thus estimated through OLS. For the remaining endogenous
variables, I will implement an estimation procedure reputed robust to weak instruments, as described
in Mikusheva and Poi [2006].
Table 2 presents the ﬁrst stage statistics of the two stage least squares estimation. Usual criteria to
determine whether instruments are strong enough include the partial R2, which should be sizable, and
the F-statistic. As a rule of thumb, the latter should be greater than 10 in order for the instruments
to be considered strong enough to produce unbiased estimators. We see that in our regressions, this
is often not the case. This means that our resulting instrumental variables estimators may not only
be less eﬃcient, but also more biased than the simple OLS estimators.
However, even if the values of the F statistics are often less than 10, this statistic remains signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero in all cases except for two (the growth rates of hourly wages and unemployment
in Canada). Moreover, the ﬁrst stage R2 and the partial R2 as well tend to be reasonably large: 15%
to 50% for partial R2. That is, our instrumental variables retain some explanatory power for the
endogenous variables.
There are two main reasons why the F statistics are so low in our regressions. Firstly, the relatively nu-
merous endogenous regressors means that we need a large number of instrumental variables to achieve
identiﬁcation, and to reasonably explain all of them. Coupled with the equally numerous exogenous
regressors, our ﬁrst stage regression models contain numerous explanatory variables. This leads in
turn to a low eﬃciency of our estimators and a low F statistic value. Secondly, the included exogenous
variables tend to “absorb” a great part of the explanatory power in the ﬁrst stage regressions, at the
expense of the excluded exogenous variables.
Table 3 reports the Sargan’s test statistic for overidentiﬁcation. The null hypothesis being that the
instruments are compatible, we can see that none of the test results are problematic in this respect.
11growth of US Canada Japan United Kingdom Germany France Spain Italy
BCI regressions
GDP 0,86 0,97 0,46 0,77 0,66 0,51 0,51 0,19
Wage 0,71 0,25 0,36 0,98 0,48 0,63 0,72 0,51
Unemp. 0,63 0,55 0,80 0,99 0,92 0,88 0,49 0,23
GFCF 0,33 0,61 0,66 0,10 0,92 0,57 0,24 0,50
Cap. U. 0,01* 0,35 0,01* 0,27 0,27 0,51 0,30 0,98
CCI regressions
GDP 0,53 0,44 0,33 0,20 0,07* 0,59 0,05* 0,15
Cons. 0,48 0,90 0,55 0,11 0,92 0,62 0,39 0,74
Table 4 – P-values of exogeneity tests
4.2 Exogeneity tests
As we have said in the previous section, the ﬁrst stage statistics indicate that OLS estimation might be
the better option for our estimations. Results of exogeneity tests, summed up in Table 4, actually tend
to support this choice: only four explanatory variables seem to be truly endogenous. At a threshold
of 10%, in the Business Conﬁdence regressions, the growth rate of capacity utilization in the United
States and Japan appears to be endogenous. We also reject exogeneity for the growth rate of GDP in
Germany and Spain in the Consumer Conﬁdence regressions.
Of course, if our instruments are truly weak instruments, then the results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman
test may be questionned as well. But we have seen that partial R2 and p-values for the F statistic
show that the instruments do have signiﬁcant explantory power for the variables to be tested. For
this reason, we will choose to trust the results of the exogeneity tests.
How to interpret the fact that all these macroeconomic variables actually appear to be exogenous?
We can postulate that, while conﬁdence is free to shift instantaneously, agents may take a few months
to adjust their behaviour to a change in expectations. Then, changes in the real economy due to
changes in conﬁdence do not appear contemporaneously; hence the apparent exogeneity.
We now have two good reasons to choose OLS estimation instead of instrumental variables estima-
tion. Firstly, ﬁrst stage statistics show that that latter may be even more biased than the former,
not to mention less eﬃcient. Secondly, most of our potentially endogenous variables appear to be
exogenous. For those four variables of which the endogeneity is conﬁrmed by the exogeneity tests, I
have implemented an instrumental variable estimation and inference procedure that is robust to weak
instruments: conditional likelihood ratio estimation. This procedure is described in more details in
Mikusheva and Poi [2006]
12Growth of :
GDP Cons. Wage Unemp. GFCF Cap. Int. Share L. L. Inﬂ.
U. Rate P. GDP Unemp.
Business Conﬁdence Index
US + - +
Canada - +
Japan - + +
UK - + +
Germany + + + +
France + - + + +
Spain - + +
Italy + + + +
Consumer Conﬁdence Index
US + - - -
Canada + + +
Japan + + +
UK + - - +
Germany + +
France + + + + -
Spain + - +
Italy + + -
Table 5 – Domestic macroeconomic variables that have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on conﬁdence
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Domestic macroeconomic variables
Table 5 summarizes the results of all the domestic regressions. For readability, I have not reported all
coeﬃcient estimates and standard errors. The cells in the table are left empty when the corresponding
coeﬃcient estimate is not signiﬁcative at a threshold of 10%. When the signiﬁcative coeﬃcient is
positive, the cell is ﬁlled by a + sign; when it is negative, by a − sign.
For a majority of variables, the sign of the coeﬃcient estimate is intuitive. Both consumer conﬁdence
and business conﬁdence increase when the growth rate of GDP increases; and they both decrease
when unemployment is on the rise. Only very few results are counterintuitive: the eﬀect of changes
in share prices in the US, for instance, which appears to be negative on Business Conﬁdence.
Overall, several results stand out. Capacity utilization seems to be the most important variable in the
determination of business conﬁdence. For both business and consumer conﬁdence, the growth rates of
GDP, of unemployment, of long term interest rates, and of share prices seem to be important factors.
Surprisingly, the growth rate of consumption does not appear to have a signiﬁcant impact on the level
of consumer conﬁdence.
Moreover, the arrival of “headline news” information does not generally seem to have a strong inﬂuence
on conﬁdence. That is, lagged values of macroeconomic series do not contribute to the determination
of conﬁdence levels as often as contemporaneous series. This shows that agents’ sentiment is based on
the macroeconomic conjuncture that they are experiencing, and not so much on the information that
13they receive from the media. For instance, when a household observes that one of its members has
been made redundant, or observes that unemployment is rising in its neighbourhood, it will adjust
its conﬁdence level immediately. It does not in general wait for the oﬃcial unemployment rate to be
published the next quarter.




2 increment country foreign CI foreign GDP
Consumer Conﬁdence Index
United States 85,0% 3,7%
Canada 79,3% 7,6% 3,7% US (+) both none
Japan 89,6% 3,3% 0,9% EA (+) both none
United Kingdom 83,1% 2,8% - - - -
Germany 86,1% 3,0% - - - -
France 89,4% 3,0% 1,0% DE (+) both none
Spain 88,7% 1,4% 4,4% US (+) 1. none
Spain 3,5% FR (+) none 1.
Italy 82,4% 6,9% 1,1% DE (+) both none
Business Conﬁdence Index
United States 65,8% 23,2%
Canada 64,2% 21,5% 3,9% US (+) 1. L.
Japan 90,8% 5,8% - - - -
United Kingdom 84,1% 7,0% 2,4% US (+) 1. 1.
United Kingdom 1,2% EA both none
Germany 84,3% 11,7% 0,7% US (+) 1. none
France 83,2% 12,0% 0,9% US (+) 1. none
France 2,0% DE (+) both 1.
Spain 88,9% 4,1% 2,5% DE (+) both none
Spain 3,3% FR (+) both none
Spain 0,9% US (+) 1. none
Italy 83,2% 10,2% 1,3% US (+) 1. none
Italy 2,4% DE (+) both none
Italy 2,4% FR (+) both none
Table 6 – Fit of basic, domestic and ﬁnal regressions
5.2 Inﬂuence of large countries
Let us now move on to analysing the inﬂuence of large country conﬁdence level in the determination
of small country conﬁdence level. This is estimated thanks to our “ﬁnal” regressions. As we have
said before, we consider that the conﬁdence level of a large country plays a role in the determination
of conﬁdence in a smaller country if, ﬁrstly, the inclusion of the foreign GDP and conﬁdence series
produce a greater regression ﬁt, and secondly, at least one of the included foreign conﬁdence series
has an estimated parameter that is signiﬁcantly positive.
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 6 present the R2 of all our regression models. For domestic regressions,
the value given is the R2 increment over the basic regressions when domestic variables are added to
the model. For ﬁnal regressions, the value given is the R2 increment over the domestic regressions
when foreign explanatory variables are added to the model. The fourth column indicates the large
14country of which the conﬁdence series are signiﬁcative and produce such an R2 increment. The cells
in the third and fourth column are left empty if no variables from any larger country has produced an
improvement in R2 and a signiﬁcant estimated parameter. Of course, for some countries, many large
countries may have an inﬂuence.
We ﬁnd that business conﬁdence seems to be more heavily inﬂuenced by the environment than con-
sumer conﬁdence, be it by the domestic macroeconomic situation or by international factors. The
R2 increment in business conﬁdence regressions from basic to domestic models ranges from 4,1% to
23,2%, whereas for consumer conﬁdence regressions it ranges from 1,4% to 7,6% and is in general con-
siderably lower. Business conﬁdence regressions ﬁt is also much more often improved by the addition
of foreign variables than in the case of consumer conﬁdence regressions.
Overall, we can conclude that the conﬁdence of agents in large countries does play a role in the
determination of conﬁdence of agents in smaller countries. Except for three cases, all conﬁdence series
can be better explained with the inclusion of foreign variables, rather than by using domestic variables
alone. Therefore, the conﬁdence contagion eﬀect that we were looking for does seem to exist.
How to interpret those results?
The inclusion of foreign GDP and lagged GDP series in the same regression models allows us to control
for the relevance of our interpretation. Indeed, it is possible that small countries’ conﬁdence reacts
not to movements in the large countries’ conﬁdence level, but to the accompanying changes in the
large countries’ real economy. The signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients describing the impacts of GDP series
and conﬁdence series is detailled in columns ﬁve and six of Table 6. 1. indicates that the series of
contemporanous values has a signiﬁcant impact on conﬁdence; L. indicates that the series of lagged
once values has a signiﬁcant impact on conﬁdence. At some cases, both series are signiﬁcant, or none.
We can say that my previous interpretation remains valid if only one or both the conﬁdence series
parameters are signiﬁcant, or if parameters concerning conﬁdence series and GDP are jointly signiﬁ-
cant. However, if parameters concerning GDP are signiﬁcant, and parameters concerning conﬁdence
are not signiﬁcant, then we can conclude that conﬁdence contagion takes place in an indirect way,
through the real eﬀects that accompany changes in conﬁdence.
We observe that in only one instance, that is, the addition of French variables in the regression
concerning Spanish consumer conﬁdence, the R2 increment is due to the inclusion of GDP series and
not of conﬁdence series. Spanish consumer conﬁdence is therefore not inﬂuenced by French, but only
by American, consumer conﬁdence. No other small/large country couples exhibit this problem. So
we can safely say that conﬁdence contagion exists in a direct sense between countries.
As a second type of control, I have checked whether the observed eﬀect really comes from a contagion
from large to small countries, or simply from some bilateral similarity between conﬁdence series
due to unobservable underlying causes (global shocks, for instance). To that eﬀect, I have taken
the US domestic regression and added in turn foreign GDP and conﬁdence variables from other small
countries. Out of 16 such regressions, only 2 exhibit at the same time a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient
for the conﬁdence series of the smaller country, and a signiﬁcant increase in the ﬁt of the regression.
These two regressions are the models in which I have included the consumer or business conﬁdence
series of Canada. Given that the great majority of such regressions do not exhibit signiﬁcant eﬀects,
15Coeﬃcient ratio p-value of Wald test
c2/c1
Consumer Conﬁdence Index
Canada (US) 1,00 0,98
Japan (EA) 1,01 0,22
France (DE) 0,99 0,63
Spain (US) 1,00 0,78
Italy (DE) 1,01 0,18
Business Conﬁdence Index
Canada (US) 0,99 0,40
United Kingdom (US) 0,98 0,05
United Kingdom (EA) 0,99 0,46
Germany (US) 1,01 0,26
France (US) 1,01 0,01
France (DE) 1,00 0,37
Spain (US) 1,01 0,64
Spain (FR) 1,00 0,92
Spain (DE) 1,01 0,03
Italy (US) 1,01 0,48
Italy (FR) 0,99 0,11
Italy (DE) 0,99 0,18
Table 7 – Asymetric eﬀects in times of increasing or decreasing conﬁdence
it is very probable that the relationships listed in Table 6 are due to a contagion from large countries
to smaller countries, and not only to bilateral similarities.
5.3 Asymmetric eﬀects
We have seen in the previous section that there existed a phenomenon of conﬁdence contagion from
large countries to small countries. It is often assumed that one of the major roles of the conﬁdence
channel would be to accelerate the transmission of adverse macroeconomic shocks, before even the real
shocks take place in the larger country. It would therefore be very interesting to know if conﬁdence
contagion becomes stronger during periods of bad macroeconomic conjuncture, or simply when the
conﬁdence of agents in the large country decreases, compared to when it increases.
I use the same method already employed by Horn [2003] to test this hypothesis of asymmetric inﬂuence.
I only consider the large / small country pairings that appeared in the previous section. The new
regression models are the following:
(
up = 1 & down = 0 si (1 − L)Cg ≥ 0
up = 0 & down = 1 sinon
uCg = up × Cg ; dCl = down × Cl










where L is the lag operator, Ct is the domestic conﬁdence indicator, Xi,t are macroeconomic variables
16Consumer Conﬁdence Index
US → all countries Stronger inﬂuence in times of rising conﬁdence. This
is especially true in the cases of France, Germany,
Japan and the Euro Area.
EA → UK No result
EA → JP Stronger inﬂuence in times of rising conﬁdence.
DE → FR, IT, SP, UK Stronger inﬂuence in times of rising conﬁdence.
Business Conﬁdence Index
US → JP Much stronger inﬂuence where US conﬁdence drops.
US → all countries No result
EA → UK Clearly stronger inﬂuence in times of decreasing
conﬁdence. DE → FR, IT, SP
DE → JP Stronger inﬂuence in times of rising conﬁdence.
EA→ JP No result
Table 8 – Asymetric eﬀects in regressions involving only monthly conﬁdence series
(in growth), and Cl
t is the conﬁdence indicator of the large country. As before, Yt is the domestic
GDP and Y l
t is the GDP of the large country ; Ut is the growth rate of domestic unemployment.
A Wald test for parameter equality is then applied to the coeﬃcients du
0 and dd
0. If an asymmetric
eﬀect exists, then the Wald test should reject the null hypothesis of parameter equality. We should
also observe dd
0 > du
0. I have also checked that splitting up the variable in two did not aﬀect its
signiﬁcativity and that both parameters remained positive.
The results are presented in Table 7. The large country is written in parenthesis. The ﬁrst column
corresponds to the coeﬃcient ratio dd
0/du
0. If this ratio is greater than 1, the estimated impact of a
loss of conﬁdence in the large country is probably greater than the impact of a gain in conﬁdence
in the large country. However, we observe that this ratio is greater than 1 in only 7 out of our 17
cases. This is not very convincing. Moreover, the p-values of the Wald test, presented in the second
column, show that in an overwehlming majority of cases, the null hypothesis of coeﬃcient equality
cannot be rejected. That is, there is no diﬀerence between times of conﬁdence increases or decreases
in terms of contagion. In only three cases, this null hypothesis is rejected at a threshold of 10%; and
amongst those three cases, one corresponds to a higher impact in times of rising conﬁdence, and two
correspond to a higher impact in times of decreasing conﬁdence.
We are lead to reject very strongly the hypothesis that confdence contagion is always stronger in times
of loss of conﬁdence in the large country.
Faced with disappointing results, I implemented an alternative regression model, without any macroe-
conomic explanatory variable, and which makes use of monthly conﬁdence series. The estimated im-
pact of the conﬁdence channel is ampliﬁed, and precision improved by reﬁning the frequency. Table 8
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CCI BCI CCI BCI
United States I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0)
Canada I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1)
Japan I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
United Kingdom I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1)
Euro Area I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Germany I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1)
France I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Italy I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Spain I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Table 9 – Integration of conﬁdence series, Phillips-Perron, size 1%
summarizes the results, which I do not present in detail for readability. Only business conﬁdence con-
tagion between european countries conﬁrm our original hypothesis. Regarding consumer conﬁdence,
the contagion is generally stronger in times of rising conﬁdence. However, these results are clearly
disputable, because we did not control for macroeconomic eﬀects.
6 Cointegration of conﬁdence series
Some conﬁdence series being integrated of order 1 (Table 9), I come back to the previously men-
tionned question of spurious relations. In order to avoid this problem, I will test for the presence of
cointegration relationships between conﬁdence series of large and small countries, where applicable:
that is, when a signiﬁcantly positive relationship is given by our instrumental variable regressions, and
moreover both conﬁdence series involved are integrated. To do this, I simply use Johansen tests on



























where C is a conﬁdence series, Cl is a conﬁdence series from a large country. For the uncovered
cointegration relationships to be compatible with our hypothese, the following properties must also
be veriﬁed :
• α is negative → there is comovement between the series
• θ2 is positive and signiﬁcative → the conﬁdence level of agents in the small country does not
depart too widely from the conﬁdence level of agents in the large country
• If θ1 is signiﬁcative, it must be negative → otherwise, the conﬁdence series of the large country
generated by the model is unstable
Table 10 lists the few signiﬁcant relations from the previous section which could be spurious, and
indicates whether the series involved are cointegrated in a way that satisﬁes these conditions. The








Table 10 – Cointegration relations
of all, I have used all available observations in estimating those models. However, these cointegration
relationships seem to be extremely sensitive to the period taken into account. That is, by taking
a few quarters out at the beginning or the end of the available period, the results of the tests can
change arbitrarily. We can conclude that the results in Table 10 are not very robust. Secondly, we
have accepted the null hypothesis of the Phillips-Perron test at a level of 1%. It happens that for
most series, this null hypothesis would then be rejected if we chose a level of 5% instead. It is possible
that our conﬁdence series are simply stationary, and that could be the reason why few cointegration
relationships appear.
197 Conclusion
On the basis of intuitive hypotheses, and using conventional econometric tools, I have conducted a
systematic investigation into the existence of a conﬁdence channel between G7 countries (and Spain).
Through simple correlations, I have shown that conﬁdence series are undeniably well-synchronized
between countries, in particular within the Euro Area. Business conﬁdence series seem to be better
synchronized than consumer conﬁdence series.
The main goal of this paper is to demonstrate an inﬂuence of conﬁdence levels in large countries on
conﬁdence levels in small countries. I have implemented instrumental variable regressions in order to
ascertain the factors that determine agents’ conﬁdence. Contemporaneous macroeconomic variables
capture agents’ reaction to their economic environment, while lagged values of GDP and unemploy-
ment growth rates represent a “headlines” eﬀect. On a domestic level, the growth rate of GDP,
of unemployment, interest rates and share prices seem to be the most important factors accross all
countries for both consumers and business conﬁdence ; furthermore, capacity utilization rates are
always signiﬁcantly linked to business conﬁdence. Household consumption, hourly wages, inﬂation or
investment, along with headline variables, appear to have little eﬀect.
By introducing conﬁdence series of large countries into those models, I have shown that agents’
conﬁdence in large countries almost always plays a role in the formation of conﬁdence levels of agents
in small countries. When conﬁdence series are not stationary, tests of cointegration produce ambiguous
results.
The possibility of asymmetric eﬀects is also investigated. Because we have seen that there conﬁdence
contagion exists, it is important to know whether this contagion produces stronger eﬀects during
times of decreasing conﬁdence, as this could be a crucial mechanism in accelerating and amplifying the
spreading of negative macroeconomic shocks worldwide. Modiﬁed regressions leaving a supplementary
degree of freedom for asymmetric eﬀects do not conﬁrm this hypothesis in general.
The main results of this paper is thus: conﬁdence contagion takes place from larger countries to
smaller countries, at least within G7 (and Spain); this holds true for both households and businesses.
In light of this ﬁnding, the macroeconomic eﬀects of the conﬁdence channel are certainly worthy of
further investigation.
I have tried to address technical problems such as endogeneity by using instrumental variable regres-
sions. However, it is clear that the treatment of endogeneity could be improved by ﬁnding better
instrumental variables. Another interesting path for future research would be to fully address the
second part of the problematic: in order for there to be a conﬁdence “channel” for the transmis-
sion of macroeconomic shocks, simple conﬁdence contagion must be shown to have an impact on
the real macroeconomic situation of the small countries concerned. This investigation could be done
through appropriate structural VAR models and impulse-response functions. Lastly, the research into
a possible conﬁdence channel would vastly beneﬁt from a proper theoretical framework.
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21A Annexe : Series de conﬁance
Most of the information given below is directly taken from OECD data “Sources and Deﬁnition”.
Conﬁdence indicators are taken from the OECD Monthly Economic Indicators. The data, as well as
the relative information can be found on the OECD website
http://stats.oecd.org/
All series except for Canadian CCI are deseasonalized.
Method of construction Questions in the following polls generally have three possible answers : “worse”,
“same” or “better”. For each questions, the percentage of people having answered “worse” is sub-
stracted from the percentage of people having answered “better”. Taking the mean for all questions,
we obtain the composite index. These are the “balance” series, which are more or less centered around
zero. Note that the OECD standardizes the national series in order to ensure comparability accross
the board of countries.
A.1 Beginning and end of series
Estimations in general have been run over the complete available time period of each series involved.
Consumer Conﬁdence Business Conﬁdence
United States January 1978 - May 2009 January 1960 - August 2009
Zone Euro January 1973 - May 2009 January 1985 - August 2009
Japan Juin 1982 - Mars 2009 June 1974 - June 2009
United Kingdom January 1974 - May 2009 January 1985 - August 2009
Germany January 1973 - May 2009 January 1985 - August 2009
France January 1973 - May 2009 January 1985 - July 2009
Italy January 1973 - May 2009 January 1985 - August 2009
Spain Juin 1986 - April 2009 April 1987 - August 2009
Canada January 1990 - May 2009 January 1992 - January 2009
Table 11 – Beginning and end of series
A.2 Consumer Conﬁdence Index
United States University of Michigan
The index is compiled by the University of Michigan thanks to the results from a survey of consumers
based on telephone interviews of approximately 500 households per month.
Questions asked are the following :
• We are interested in how people are getting along ﬁnancially these days. Would you say that
you (and your family living there) are better oﬀ or worse oﬀ ﬁnancially than you were a year
ago ?
22• Now looking ahead : do you think that a year from now you (and your family living there) will
be better oﬀ ﬁnancially, or worse oﬀ, or just about the same as now ?
• Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole, do you think that during the next
twelve months we ll have good times ﬁnancially, or bad times, or what ?
• Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely : that in the country as a whole we ll have
continuous good times during the next ﬁve years or so, or that we will have peiods of widespread
unemployment or depression, or what ?
• About the big things that people buy for their homes, such as furniture, a refrigerator, stove,
television, and things like that. Generally speaking, do you think now is a good or bad time for
people to buy major household items ?
Canada Conference Board Canada
Data is collected through a monthly survey of approximately 2000 households. A description of the
survey is available at ă
http://www.conferenceboard.ca/
The four questions asked in the survey are :
• Considering everything, would you say that your family is better or worse oﬀ ﬁnancially than
six months ago?
• Again, considering everything, do you think that your family will be better oﬀ, the same or
worse oﬀ ﬁnancially six months from now?
• How do you feel the job situation and overall employment will be in this community six months
from now?
• Do you think that right now is a good or bad time for the average person to make a major outlay
for items such as a home, car or other major item?
Zone Euro European Commission
The European Commission calculates the agregate value for the Euro Area by weighing the national
indicators by the ﬁnal consumption spending taken from national accounts.
National indicators are calculated in a harmonized way accross participating countries. The four
questions asked in the surveys are:
• Expected change in ﬁnancial situation of household over the next 12 months;
• Expected change in general economic situation over next 12 months;
• Expected change in unemployment over the next 12 months;
• Expected change in savings of household over next 12 months.
23There are ﬁve answer alternatives to each question (a lot better, a little better, the same, a little worse,
a lot worse). The conﬁdence indicator is expressed as the balance of positive over negative results.
The conﬁdence indicator published by the EC is constructed with double weights on the extremes.
Responses “a lot bette” and “a lot worse” get the weight 1 and “a little better” and “a little worse”
get the weight 1/2, and “the same” has zero weight. The composite indicator is the mean of all four
questions; the results for the question concerning unemployment are taken negatively. Apart from
Luxemburg, all countries deseasonalize their CCI series.
The following countries, that is France, Germany, Italy and Spain follow this same methodology.
France Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques
INSEE collects monthly data via telephone interviews. Sample size is 3300, and the response rate is
70%. The sampling method is random sampling using the phone register, amongst the households who
have a telephone number and who are not registered on an Şopposition listŤ. Every month, France
Télécom provides INSEE with a sample of 1100 phone numbers. Each unit is interviewed during three
consecutive months and then removed from the sample.
Germany GfK Marktforschung
The survey called ŞGfK-Wirtschaftsdienst Konsum-und SparklimaŤ (GfK ﬁnancial services, consumer
and savings climate) is conducted by GfK Marktforschung. The results are based on monthly consumer
interviews carried out in the ﬁrst half of each month. The sample size is around 2 000.
Italy Instituto di Studi e Analisi Economica
Data is collected monthly by means of telephone interviews. The sample is selected from the population
aged 18 years and over. Approximately 2000 persons are selected.
Spain Grupo Gallup Espaaśa
The selected sample represents approximately 95% of the Spanish population. The sample size is
around 2 000. Reponse rate is 33%.
United Kingdom Martin Hamblin Gfk
Data are collected monthly by telephone interview. The nationally representative sample comprises
of males and females aged 16 year and over. Quotas are set on gender, age, social class and region
to ensure representativeness. About 2000 interviews are conducted each month. Gfk produces the
Consumer Conﬁdence Barometer.
A thorough description of the survey can be found at
http://www.gfknop.com/customresearch-uk/pressinfo/releases/singlearticles/
003045/index.en.html
Japan Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Oﬃce.
The sample comprises 5040 households from 230 towns and villages. The survey interrogates house-
holds on the following topics :
• Consumer perception
24• Willingness to buy or possession of durable consumption goods (in March only)
• Journeys undertaken or planned
• Plans for consumption of services
• Overall livelihood
Results are calculated on a 5 point scale. The following evaluation points in the ﬁve response categories
are multiplied by the component ratio(%) and totalized: positive responses (improve +1), (improve
slightly +0.75); neutral response (no change +0.5); negative responses (worsen slightly+0.25), (worsen
+0). The consumer perception index is, then, the weighted average of the points of the results
A.3 Business Conﬁdence Index
Euro Area European Commission
The indicator is the arithmetic average of the balances of the answers to the following four questions.
Unemployment results are used inverted. The sum of the replies for each Member States are weighted
in the Community total with the ﬁnal consumption expenditures.
• Production perspectives : “How do you expect your preduction to develop in the 3 coming
months? It will + improve, = remain unchanged, - deteriorate”
• Volume of stocks : level : “Do you consider the volume of stock currently hold to be...? + too
large (above normal) = adequate (normal for the season) - too small (below normal)”.
• Order books : level : “Do you consider your current overall order books to be ...? + more than
suﬃcient (above normal) = suﬃcient (normal for the season) - not suﬃcient (below normal)”
The national indicators which are calculated in this way are those of France, Germany, Italy and
Spain.
France Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques
4500 enterprises are surveyed each month, except in August, by the Economic Outlook Department
of INSEE. The survey covers 70% of total sales in the manufacturing industry. The method used
is stratiﬁed sampling without replacement and with unequal probabilities. Each sample stratum
corresponds to one activity sector (using the French NAF-NSE classiﬁcation since April 1999). A
quarterly survey complements the monthly one. Results for aggregated indexes are published before
the end of the month and ﬁfteen days later for the split levels.
Germany Institute for Economic Research
IFO started the monthly survey in 1962. Data are derived from a survey of 7000 enterprises, with the
sample size for the manufacturing data being 3600 ﬁrms. The results are published one week after
the Ifo Business Climate Index is released. The response rate is 85
Italy Instituto di Studi e Analisi Economica
25The ISAE Monthly Survey started in 1962 and currently uses a sample size of 4000 enterprises with
more than 10 employees. The survey is carried out at the end of each month by ISAE in line with
EU recommendations. Questionnaires are mailed the week preceding the month of the inquiry (Mt);
only answers arriving during the ﬁrst two weeks of the following month are taken account of. The
response rate is 95%.
Spain Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio, Subdirection General de Estudios
The published monthly data are compiled from the results of the survey ’Encuesta de Coyuntura
Industrial’, conducted in 3 500 enterprises by the Ministry of Industry. The survey started in 1987.
The questionnaires are collected mainly in the ﬁrst fortnight of the month, the main means of commu-
nication being ordinary post, or fax, and further responses are received by telephone. The response
rate is 62%.
United Kingdom Confederation of British Industry
Data are collected from the Quarterly Industrial Trends Survey and the Monthly Trends Inquiry
carried out by the CBI using, on average, a sample of 1500 respondents. The Industrial Trends
Survey (quarterly and monthly) started in 1958. The monthly and quarterly surveys are conducted
within the ﬁrst fortnight of each month with results available before the end of the month in question.
CBI business survey samples are constructed from the following sources: CBI parent membership
and subsidiary lists, UK sector trade associations, CBI Regional Oﬃce contact, Electronic database
sources such as Dun & Bradstreet, FAME, KBE.
Japan Bank of Japan
Data are derived from the Bank of Japan’s quarterly Short-term Economic Survey of Enterprises in
Japan (TANKAN). The survey is conducted in March, June, September and December. Results are
released at the beginning of April, July, October, and mid-December. The answer sheet is deliver
and collected by mail. The sample enterprises are selected from a population of all private enterprises
in Japan employing ﬁfty or more persons (or twenty or more persons in the wholesaling, retailing,
services, and leasing industries). In publishing the surveys, the enterprises are classiﬁed by size
into large, medium and small according to their number of employees, as follows: Large enterprises:
1,000 employees or more Medium-sized enterprises: 300-999 employees Small enterprises: 20/50-299
employees. Questions concerning anticipations of the future refer to an horizon of three or four months.
Variables collected are
• Volume of stocks: level
• Selling prices: future tendency
• Employment: future level
• Capacity utilization rate: future tendency
• Business situation - activity: present
• Business situation - activity: future tendency
26United States Institute for Supply Management, US
The Manufacturing ISM Report On Business is based on data compiled from monthly replies to ques-
tions asked of purchasing and supply executives in over 400 industrial companies, for 370 purchasing
and supply executives in over 62 diﬀerent industries representing nine divisions from the Standard In-
dustrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) categories. Membership of the Business Survey Committee is diversiﬁed
by SIC category and is based on each industry’s contribution to Gross Domestic Product.
The index produced by ISM is well-known under the name of Purchasing Managers Index. Questions
asked are the following:
• Production: tendency relative to previous month
• Order books: level
• Orders inﬂow: tendency relative to previous month
• Export orders inﬂow: tendency relative to previous month
• Raw material stocks: tendency relative to previous month
• Employment: tendency relative to previous month
Canada Statistics Canada
Data are derived from the quarterly Business Conditions Survey (in January, April, July and October).
The survey is conducted by Statistics Canada since January 1976, through a mail out-mail back form
collection follow-up is only done for the top manufacturers. A fax reminder and questionnaire is sent
to respondents who have not replied 3 days prior to the survey closing date.The results of the Business
Conditions Survey reﬂect businessmen’s judgements on their own situation at the time of the survey
and their expectations for the next three-month period. Data are collected from a sample of about
9,000 manufacturing establishments selected from the frame maintained by the Business Register.
The sample used for this survey is the sample used for the monthly Survey of Manufacturing and is
revised bi-annually to reﬂect changes in the composition of the Canadian manufacturing population.
The population is stratiﬁed by industry within province and each stratum is then divided into three
substrata of large, medium and small establishments according to the shipment value reported to the
ASM. All large establishments are surveyed and a systematic sample is independently selected within
each of the other two size (medium and small establishments) substrata. The average response rate
for the BCS is 45%.
Variables collected are
• Production: future tendency
• Finished goods stocks: level
• Order books: level
• Orders inﬂow: tendency
• Employment: future tendency
27B Appendix : Macroeconomic data
Macroeconomic series were downloaded either from Datastream, or from Banque de Series Monetaires
et Economiques of the Bank of France.
Gross Domestic Product Gross domestic product, volume, at the price levels and PPPs of 2005
(million USD)
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, database Economic Outlook
Consumption Private Final Consumption Expenditure, volume
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, database Economic Outlook
Investment Gross Fixed Capital Formation, total, volume
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, database Economic Outlook
Unemployment
• United States : Harmonised unemployment rate: all persons, Organisation for Economic Coop-
eration and Development, Main Economic Indicators
• France : Unemployement rate, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, database
Economic Outlook, percentage, seasonally adjusted
• Italy : Unemployment rate (% of total labour force), Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development, database Main Economic Indicators, percentage, seasonally adjusted
• Japan : Standardized unemployment rate, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment, database Main Economic Indicators, percentage, seasonally adjusted
• Spain : Standardized unemployment rate, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment, database Main Economic Indicators, percentage, seasonally adjusted
• Germany : Standardized unemployment rate, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment, database Main Economic Indicators, percentage, seasonally adjusted
• Germany de l Ouest : Unemployment rate (% civilian labour force), Deutsche Bundesbank,
percentage, seasonally adjusted
• United Kingdom : Harmonised unemployment rate: all persons, Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, database Main Economic Indicators
Capacity Utilization Rate
• United States : Rate of capacity utilisation in industry, Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development, database Main Economic Indicators
• France : Industry survey: capacity utilisation, INSEE, percentage, seasonally adjusted
28• Spain : Utilisation of productive capacity - industry total, Ministerio de Economia y Hadencia,
percentage
• Italy : ISAE business survey: capacity utilisation rate, ISAE, percentage
• Japan : Rate of capacity utilisation in industry, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, database Main Economic Indicators, index, seasonally adjusted
• United Kingdom : Industry survey: capacity utilisation, European Commission, percentage,
seasonally adjusted
• Germany : Industry survey: capacity utilisation, European Commission, percentage, seasonally
adjusted
• Canada : Rate of capacity utilisation in industry, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, database Main Economic Indicators, index, seasonally adjusted
Inﬂation Consumer Price Index, All Items, Index publication base
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, database Main Economic Indicators
Hourly Wages
• United States : Hourly wages, International Monetary Fund, database International Financial
Statistics, price index
• France : Hourly wage rates all activities, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, database Main Economic Indicators, price index
• Germany : Wages and salaries per manhour, International Monetary Fund, database Interna-
tional Financial Statistics (Prices, Production, Labor)
• Canada : Wages: hourly earnings, International Monetary Fund, database International Finan-
cial Statistics (Prices, Production, Labor)
• Spain : Hourly wages, International Monetary Fund, database International Financial Statistics
(Prices, Production, Labor)
• Italy : Contractual wage per person excluding family allocations, International Monetary Fund,
database International Financial Statistics (Prices, Production, Labor)
• Japan : Wages: monthly earnings, International Monetary Fund, database International Finan-
cial Statistics (Prices, Production, Labor)
• United Kingdom : Average earnings production industry, International Monetary Fund, database
International Financial Statistics (Prices, Production, Labor)
Disposable Income Household Disposable Income in Real Terms, constant prices, national currency
(millions), seasonally adjusted
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, database Economic Outlook
29Long-term Interest Rates Long-term interest rates, Monthly, Per cent per annum (10 years gov-
ernment bonds)
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, database Reference Series
Share Prices Shares Prices, Index
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, database Monthly Economic Indicators,
Financial Indicators
Trade Balance Total Exports less Imports of Goods, Monthly, in billions Current Prices (US Dollars)
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, database Reference Series
Labor Costs Unit Labour Costs
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, database Quarterly Indicators
Civilian Employment Civilian Employment
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, database Monthly Economic Indicators,
Labour Force Statistics
Short-term Interest Rate Short-term interest rates, Per cent per annum Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, database Monthly Economic Indicators, Financial Indicators
Remark : In the case of Germany, when the series for the whole of Germany where not available at
the desired time-horizon, Germany has been assimilated to West Germany. Necessary adjustments
were made concerning the 1991 period.
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